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January 2004.1. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental issue facing individuals in
less-developed countries (LDCs) is lack of
access to credit. Credit markets allow indivi-
duals to smooth consumption in the face of
highly variable incomes, provide capital for
investment projects, and improve the ability to
cope with unexpected expenditure shocks,
including those associated with illness, crop
loss, and unemployment. Recent evidence also
suggests that improving access to credit mar-
kets may have an impact on the adoption of
new technologies, nutrition, health, and edu-
cation outcomes (Jacoby & Skouﬁas, 1997;
Morduch, 1999; Pitt & Khandker, 1998).
This paper aims to contribute to important
policy debates on the determinants of access to
credit markets in developing countries. Some
facts about credit markets are well-docu-
mented. In particular, lack of collateral, il-
literacy, and high default risk can hinder an122individual’s access to credit in low-income
environments (Adams & Fitchett, 1992; Besley,
1995). Much less is understood about the spe-
ciﬁc role of social networks in enhancing credit
access. A growing literature on microﬁnance
suggests that nonmarket institutions can play
an important role dealing with credit market5
WORLD DEVELOPMENT1226imperfections. 1 There is very little empirical
work, however, that documents the role of
community institutions in credit markets. 2
In this paper, we investigate how family and
community networks aﬀect an individual’s
access to credit institutions using data from
Indonesia. The emphasis here is on the family’s
and community’s role in providing information
about credit market opportunities, thus lower-
ing the search costs of the borrower. Potential
borrowers may learn about lending institutions
and credit contracts through community
activities and neighborhood meetings, or
through informal interactions with neighbors
and family members. In addition, family and
community institutions may reduce monitoring
costs and enforcement costs associated with
credit contracts on the part of the lender.
Our focus on the relationship between net-
works and credit access informs a growing
body of research on the impact of social insti-
tutions on economic outcomes (Fukuyama,
1995; Putnam et al., 1993). In this literature,
features of social organization such as trust,
norms, and networks that facilitate coordinated
actions are called ‘‘social capital.’’ According to
Portes (1998, p. 6), social capital represents
‘‘the ability of actors to secure beneﬁts by virtue
of their membership in social networks and
other social structures.’’ Individuals may rely
on various types of social networks, including
family and community organizations, to cope
with shocks and improve their access to ser-
vices. In recent empirical work, social cohesion
and other measures of community activity have
been shown to have a positive impact on tech-
nology adoption and environmental outcomes
(Grootaert, 1999; Isham, 2002; Narayan &
Pritchett, 1999). We investigate the extent to
which community activity confers beneﬁts by
fostering information exchange about new
credit opportunities and building trust among
potential lending partners.
Identifying the relevant measures of the
community network can be challenging. In our
study, we rely on whether the individual has
participated in the community meeting in the
survey period. This variable reﬂects an indi-
vidual’s access to reliable information about
credit market opportunities and also the degree
to which community-level monitoring and
sanctions can be eﬀective for a given individual.
We also measure the number of economically
active siblings and family wealth in order to
capture the extent and quality of the family
network.There are some notable concerns with our
measure of the community networks. Individ-
ual-level participation in community activity
may be an endogenous choice variable, if
individuals who wish to borrow from credit
sources also choose to participate actively in
associational life. 3 Our measure of family
networks is less problematic since the number
of economically active siblings is more likely to
be exogenous to both the borrowing and lend-
ing decision. We attempt to address these issues
using two methods: ﬁrst, we address this
problem using the instrumental variable
approach. Candidate instruments are variables
that are correlated with participation in com-
munity networks, but not directly correlated
with the propensity to borrow in the survey
period. We also control for the role of unob-
served heterogeneity (such as infrastructure
quality and community leadership) at the
community level by adopting a community
ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation.
Our empirical results are based on a new
longitudinal survey, the Indonesia Family Life
Survey (IFLS) (Frankenberg & Karoly, 1995;
Frankenberg & Thomas, 2000). The IFLS
provides a representative sample of about 83%
of the Indonesian population. 4 In addition, the
IFLS data provide unusually detailed measures
of family and community networks, as well as
information on access to credit. The data used
in the survey also allow us to investigate how
gender, household resources, and community
characteristics aﬀect the beneﬁts from social
networks within credit markets.
Our main results indicate that community
and family networks are important in know-
ing a place to borrow and obtaining credit.
Networks are particularly important in gain-
ing knowledge about new credit sources, with
less of an impact on established sources of
credit. This suggests an information-based
explanation of the role of networks in credit
market transactions. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that
women beneﬁt from participating in commu-
nity networks more than men. Finally, social
networks may play an important role in
improving credit access among poor borrow-
ers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 provides a description of the setting.
In Section 3, we present the conceptual frame-
work. Section 4 discusses estimation methods.
Section 5 discusses the data sources. In Sec-
tion 6, we present results, and Section (7) con-
cludes.
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THE FAMILY, COMMUNITY
INSTITUTIONS IN INDONESIA
Indonesia’s socioeconomic and geographic
diversity provides a rich setting in which to
explore the role of family and community net-
works in credit markets. Although community
institutions may diﬀer in their leadership,
eﬀectiveness, and socio-cultural environments
across Indonesia, a recent history of central-
ization means that there are some similarities in
local institutions across regions. 5 In both rural
and urban areas, town and village councils
administer government programs and services
in key sectors including health care and edu-
cation. Community-level programs are often
headed by a village chief (Kepala Desa) or by
the head of an urban village unit (Kepala Kel-
urahan).
An important class of beneﬁts provided by
community organizations is information about
existing services and programs. There is con-
cern, however, that information about how
to access new services may not always reach
target populations, particularly when recent
migrants, low-income groups, and women face
low rates of participation in village and town-
level meetings. 6 There is a need to raise aware-
ness about new programs and services among
the poor. 7 In addition, a recent history of
highly centralized and personal rule in Indo-
nesia may have fostered an environment where
households with family members and friends
in government may enjoy greater access to
community-level services.
Indonesia has witnessed a tremendous expan-
sion in ﬁnancial services over the past three
decades as a result of economic growth and
deregulation. Financial intermediation has
evolved to include private banks, government
banks, informal credit institutions such as
money lenders and rotating savings and credit
associations (ROSCAs), or arisans, as well as
new credit sources, mainly co-operatives,
7neighborhood institutions, and new govern-
ment programs aimed at improving access
to credit among poor households (Seibel &
Parhusip, 2003).
One of the most well-established banks is
the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), or People’s
Bank of Indonesia (Robinson, 1994). 8 The
modern BRI was established in 1950 and has
grown to include an extensive network of over
4,000 banks that provide local ﬁnancial ser-
vices to approximately one-third of Indonesianhouseholds, mostly in rural areas. The BRI
has a successful record in rural banking ser-
vices and promoting the development of the
agricultural sector. Interest rates on loans
administered through the BRI are relatively
low, but collateral is often required (usually in
the form of a land certiﬁcate) to secure a
loan. 9 In general, the success of BRI lending
programs may be linked to particular methods
of gathering information, monitoring loans,
and enforcing contracts. BRI agents (at the
village level) visit potential and current bor-
rowers, analyze cash ﬂow and outstanding
debts, and require character references from
neighbors and community leaders. Commu-
nity-level sanctions and loss of future access to
credit, as well as the clients’ sense of obliga-
tion to repay debts, are often cited as expla-
nations for high rates of loan repayment
(Churchill, 1999).
New government initiatives in the ﬁnancial
sector have aimed to promote savings and
credit access by targeting poor households
more directly. In August 1993, the Indonesian
government launched a large-scale poverty
reduction program called Inpres Desa Terting-
gal (IDT), or Presidential Instruction on Back-
ward Village, which channeled revolving funds
(up to US $200 million each year) to over
20,000 villages. The program provided assis-
tance to poor villages, which were identiﬁed
using economic and social indicators. The IDT
program was run during 1994–97. Approxi-
mately 34% of rural villages were covered by
the IDT program. The IDT funds (underde-
veloped village grant) were provided to self-
help groups consisting of poor families and
were meant to be repaid over a speciﬁed period.
Under the IDT program, credit allocation
decisions fell under the authority of the village
head and local residents.
The ‘‘family welfare savings’’ (TAKESRA)
and ‘‘family welfare business credit’’ (KU-
KESRA) schemes were introduced in 1995.
Both schemes grant priority to poor women in
rural areas. Families who joined the saving
fund were provided with an initial savings
deposit of 2,000 Rupiah. To participate in the
borrowing scheme, families are required to
open a savings account and become a member
of an income-generating project. One of the
main objectives of the savings scheme was to
provide initial capital for small business for-
mation. The savings and borrowing program
was managed by Indonesia’s Nation Family
Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN).
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the informal sector continues to play a domi-
nant role in credit provision despite the tre-
mendous expansion in formal banking and
ﬁnancial services (Mukherjee, 2002). While
formal credit institutions often rely on collat-
eral to screen borrowers, informal credit mar-
ket transactions tend to rely on reputation,
third party guarantees, tied contracts, and
threat of loss of future access to credit. Indi-
viduals may obtain informal credit through
family, friends, employers, neighbors, money
lenders, and rotating savings and credit asso-
ciations (ROSCAs), or arisans. For poor urban
and rural households, short-term credit is
available through pawnshops and storeowners.
In addition, small and medium-sized businesses
often rely on informal trade credit from sup-
pliers to ﬁnance production.3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we discuss more formally how
family and community networks can aﬀect
credit market transactions. Consider a given
borrower who seeks credit for an investment
project or to smooth consumption in the face of
adverse shocks to income. For the potential
borrower, the decision to apply to a speciﬁc
credit source for a loan will depend on the
availability of reliable information about lend-
ing institutions. Family and community net-
works can facilitate the ﬂow of high-quality
information about new credit market oppor-
tunities, thus lowering the search costs of the
borrower.
There is an important theoretical literature
that demonstrates how networks can facilitate
the circulation of information about market
opportunities. Kranton (1996) provides a
model in which a decentralized network of pair-
wise interactions helps agents reduce search
costs. Social interactions have been shown to
play a role in technology adoption decisions
within agriculture. In particular, farmers may
share information and learn from each other
about how to grow new crops or implement
new farming techniques (see Conley & Udry,
2003; Feder, Just, & Zilberman, 1985; Foster &
Rosenzweig, 1995). Within the labor market
context, networks can be eﬀective in reducing
search costs for job-seekers (Granovetter, 1974;
Montgomery, 1991; Munshi, 2003). Drawing
on this analogy, we investigate the role that
community and family networks can play inraising awareness of new credit sources among
potential borrowers.
Our framework predicts that individuals with
stronger family and community networks will
have greater access to credit because of their
informational advantage, holding other vari-
ables constant. It is also possible that partici-
pation in community networks may have little
or no impact on credit access if community
activity does not prove useful in learning about
new credit opportunities or gaining the trust
of a new lending partner. While both family
and community networks can facilitate the
ﬂow of information regarding credit opportu-
nities, the family network may be limited in its
ability to provide new information due to its
limited group size and high correlation of
incomes within the family network. In our
setting, family networks can be classiﬁed as
strong ties and may be less useful than weak
ties (friends, acquaintances, and neighbors) in
locating credit market opportunities (Grano-
vetter, 1974). Thus, we predict that community
networks will be relatively more important
than family networks in gaining awareness of
credit sources.
We recognize that the role of family and
community networks may not be limited to the
diﬀusion of knowledge about credit opportu-
nities to potential borrowers. Within a formal
model of credit rationing, borrowers diﬀer in
their default risk. Due to asymmetric informa-
tion, lenders may limit the amount borrowed at
the prevailing interest rate and allocate credit
based on nonprice considerations (Stiglitz &
Weiss, 1981). There are often signiﬁcant costs
involved in screening borrowers, as well as in
monitoring and enforcing credit contracts for
both formal and informal lenders (Aleem,
1990). When agents interact frequently, pat-
terns of expected behavior and bonds of trust
are established, which can reduce the transac-
tion costs of lending. Furthermore, the possi-
bility of social sanctions may lower the
probability of opportunistic behavior among
borrowers.
When social networks circulate information
about borrower characteristics and actions to
lenders, the overall impact on credit outcomes
may consist of two eﬀects. First, networks may
have a direct eﬀect of credit market outcomes
if they provide information on less observable
borrower characteristics (such as ability, moti-
vation, and trustworthiness), thus improving
credit access for high-quality borrowers while
reducing credit access for low-quality borrow-
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tion in a social network will have an ambiguous
eﬀect on obtaining credit. Second, networks
may have an indirect eﬀect on credit market
outcomes if lenders simply exclude borrowers
for whom they cannot collect accurate infor-
mation. This will result in the screening out of
whole sectors since credit institutions cannot
easily distinguish between high-quality and
low-quality potential borrowers outside the
network (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 10
We should note that networks may also have
negative consequences if their presence distorts
the allocation of credit within the community.
While community institutions provide infor-
mation and other beneﬁts to those within the
community network, certain groups (based on
gender, ethnicity, or income) who are less likely
to participate in community meetings may be
excluded. 11 Thus, the presence of strong com-
munity networks may reduce access to credit
for some groups. Participating in networks
often involves high monetary and time costs,
which may prove to be a signiﬁcant burden for
the poor. Thus, strong family (or community)
ties can pose barriers to credit access if indi-
viduals divert a portion of their loans away
from productive activities and towards family
and community needs. In such a case, one
would expect that lenders would be less willing
to provide credit to individuals with strong
family and community ties (Fafchamps &
Minten, 2002).4. DATA
The empirical analysis in this paper is based
on the second wave of the Indonesia Family
Life Surveys (IFLS2), conducted in 1997–98
by RAND. The second wave of the survey is
composed of about 7,500 households (94% of
the original sample was interviewed for the
second wave and the sample also includes 800
split-oﬀs). 12 We focus on the second wave of
the survey because detailed information on
sources of credit and community networks are
not available in the ﬁrst wave of the survey,
conducted in 1993–994 (IFLS1). We can,
however, exploit the longitudinal aspect of the
survey by using a rich set of family background
and community variables available in IFLS1.
Our main dependent variable of interest is
whether an individual has successfully obtained
credit in the past 12 months. All adult respon-
dents in the sample are also asked to indicate(from a list of new and established sources of
credit) those institutions from which they suc-
cessfully obtained credit in the past 12 months.
Individuals can be classiﬁed according to
whether they applied for credit, and whether
their loan application was granted or denied.
Forty-two percent of individuals surveyed have
applied for credit. Among the credit applicants,
71% successfully obtained credit. The focus on
the outcome of the credit application process
allows us to investigate the relative importance
of family and community networks in a speciﬁc
context, where information is particularly rele-
vant.
We should note that only individuals who
indicate that they know a place to borrow are
then asked whether they borrowed in the last
12 months, which introduces sample selection
bias. From our data, 71% of individuals indi-
cate that they know at least one place where
they can borrow. We group credit sources
included in the survey into two distinct cate-
gories: new credit sources and established credit
institutions. We recognize that the distinction
between new and established credit institutions
may not always be well deﬁned. To distinguish
between new and established sources of credit
in the community, we use the Community-
Facility Survey from IFLS1, which lists the
main ﬁnancial institutions in each community
in 1993–94 and how long these have been in
existence. We also rely on descriptive sources
which provide information about new credit
institutions in Indonesia (Seibel & Parhusip,
2003).
In our analysis, sources of established credit
refer to banks, moneylenders, workplace,
pawnshops, employers, and arisans (rotating
savings and credit institution). 13 New credit
institutions include cooperatives, savings/bor-
rowing programs, village credit institutions,
neighborhood associations, and IDT programs
(underdeveloped village grants). While 60% of
the sample reports awareness of established
sources, only 33% report familiarity with new
credit sources.
In Table 1, we present summary statistics for
the full sample, individuals that applied for
credit, and those that successfully obtained
credit in the survey period. It is interesting to
note the diﬀerences in network variables for
loan applicants who were granted credit (com-
pared to those who were denied credit). An
average grantee is more likely to participate in
community meetings and has more economi-
cally active siblings than an average applicant.
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variables Full sample Applicants Grantees
N Mean N Mean N Mean
Credit indicators
Aware of a credit source (¼ 1 if aware) 19,860 0.71 5,869 1.00 4,188 1.00
Aware of a new source (¼ 1 if aware) 19,860 0.33 5,869 0.46 4,188 0.47
Aware of an established source
(¼ 1 if aware)
19,860 0.59 5,869 0.77 4,188 0.74
Apply (¼ 1 if applied for credit given that 14,106 0.42 5,869 1.00 4,188 1.00
aware of a credit source)
Granted (¼ 1 if granted credit given that
applied)
5,869 0.71 5,869 0.71 4,188 1.00
Network characteristics
Number of economically active siblings 17,052 3.94 5,241 4.63 3,835 4.84
(3.42)a (3.46) (3.37)
Individual participation in community
meeting
19,852 0.24 5,869 0.34 4,188 0.37
Individual characteristics
Head (¼ 1 if household head) 19,860 0.33 5,869 0.42 4,188 0.43
Sex (¼ 1 male) 19,859 0.46 5,869 0.52 4,188 0.51
Marital status (¼ 1 married) 19,851 0.65 5,812 0.76 4,188 0.81
Years schooling 19,645 6.52 5,868 7.08 4,146 6.87
(4.39) (4.44) (4.49)
Muslim 19,850 0.88 5,869 0.86 4,188 0.87
Age 19,851 37.30 5,869 38.00 4,187 38.68
(16.57) (14.01) (13.24)
Age squared (·103) 19,851 1.67 5,869 1.57 4,187 1.67
(1.44) (1.37) (1.13)
Government employee (¼ 1) 11,323 0.07 4,993 0.12 2,980 0.12
Recent migrant (¼ 1) 19,860 0.09 5,869 0.09 4,188 0.08
Average sibling 12,355 0.12 3,918 0.14 2,922 0.15
Nonfarm business (0.24) (0.25) (0.26)
Frequency of visits with siblings 13,394 3.26 4,522 3.26 3,383 3.28
(0.96) (0.92) (0.91)
Household variables
Per capita household expenditure (·106) 17,906 0.20 5,221 0.22 3735 0.23
(0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
Business owner in household 19,849 0.36 5,865 0.39 4,186 0.40
Farm owner in household 19,849 0.32 5,865 0.30 4,186 0.51
Household debt in 1993 (·102) 18,100 4806.70 5,383 5876.09 3,275 5078.1
(42081.8) (46939.0) (39,159)
Household size 19,859 5.93 5,869 5.91 4,188 5.65
(2.64) (2.66) (2.50)
Community characteristics
Distance to nearest ﬁnancial 18,123 3.72 5,372 3.23 3,841 3.18
Institution (in km) (7.51) (6.81) (6.64)
Urban 19,859 0.48 5,869 0.50 4,188 0.48
Ethnic diversity index 19,860 0.29 5,869 0.28 4,188 0.27
(0.37) (0.36) (0.36)
Gini coeﬃcient 18,206 0.54 5,385 0.54 3,854 0.54
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
a Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CREDIT ACCESS 1231This observation provides some preliminary
evidence that family and community networks
may impact an individual’s participation in
credit markets.
We also observe diﬀerences in individual and
community characteristics when we compare
individuals who obtained loans with an average
applicant. For example, a successful loan
applicant is more likely to come from a farm-
owning household and live in closer proximity
to a ﬁnancial institution than an applicant who
was denied credit. This observation points out
the importance of controlling for such indi-
vidual and community characteristics in our
analysis.(a) Individual and household variables
In our empirical analysis, we control for the
following individual characteristics: age, age
squared, schooling, gender, marital status,
household headship, and religion (Muslim¼ 1).
Recent migration experience and being a gov-
ernment employee can also aﬀect an individ-
ual’s awareness of and access to credit sources,
and thus we control for these variables in some
speciﬁcations.
It is important to recognize that the demand
for credit may diﬀer among households based
on the nature of household production. We
include indicators for the presence of a non-
farm enterprise owner or farm enterprise within
the household. Variables that capture economic
resources available to the individual include per
capita household expenditure, household size,
and debt burden.(b) Family network variables
To measure the extent of the individual’s
family network, we rely on the total number of
economically active siblings. We also control
for quality of the family network by con-
structing a measure of the frequency of visits
among siblings, which may proxy for the ﬂow
of information (as well as caring, altruism, and
ease of monitoring within family networks). It
is important to capture other channels through
which the family network might improve access
to credit. For instance, family wealth may act
as collateral and aid an individual in obtaining
credit. Hence, we develop sibling wealth mea-
sures based on average rate of farm and non-
farm business ownership among siblings. Data
on sibling wealth are not available in IFLS2,and thus we rely on information available in
the ﬁrst wave of the survey (IFLS1).
(c) Community network variables
Given the wide range of community-based
organizations detailed in the Community-
Facility survey, it may be diﬃcult to construct a
single index of community participation. 14 Our
preferred measure is whether the individual has
participated in the community meeting in the
survey period. Grootaert (1999) provides evi-
dence that the village governance structure is
regarded as one of the most important local
institutions in Indonesia. A participant in
associational life is likely to gather more
information about credit opportunities. This
may be particularly relevant for new credit
sources, including save/borrow programs,
neighborhood institutions, and cooperatives.
We focus on this community activity variable
because it has a clear interpretation, given the
robustness checks that we have identiﬁed,
which include community ﬁxed eﬀects. An
alternative measure based on the density of
community-level activity at the village or town-
level will reﬂect associational activity, but is
also likely to capture quality of infrastructure,
supply of credit, and other variables, which
have less to do with social networks.
We recognize that there are other channels
(market interactions, kinship, ethnicity, reli-
gious groups) that can facilitate the ﬂow of
reliable information and proper enforcement
for credit transactions. Therefore, we include
two measures of heterogeneity at the commu-
nity-level––an ethnic heterogeneity index and a
Gini coeﬃcient index. 15 The ethnic heteroge-
neity index captures the probability that two
randomly selected households speak diﬀerent
languages at home. Income and ethnic hetero-
geneity may increase the transaction costs
associated with community-level production
(Alesina & LaFerrara, 2002; Okten & Osili,
2003).
(d) Contextual variables
To control for regional variation in our data,
we include province dummies in our analysis.
Province dummies reﬂect diﬀerences in ecolog-
ical environments, resource endowments, pop-
ulation density, and other socioeconomic
diﬀerences across regions in Indonesia. We also
attempt to control for the level of economic and
ﬁnancial development in the community using
WORLD DEVELOPMENT1232the distance to the nearest ﬁnancial institution.
The distance to the nearest ﬁnancial institution
is measured from the village/town center in
kilometers.We also include an indicator vari-
able, which is equal to one for urban commu-
nities (and zero otherwise).5. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
In order to participate in a credit market, an
individual ﬁrst needs to know a place where he
or she can borrow. Our analysis rests on the
assumption that there are lending sources (new
and established) in a particular community.
The ﬁrst part of our analysis models the credit
application process. An individual’s decision to
apply depends on whether the individual has a
demand for credit, as well as whether there is
a perceived access to credit. For an individual
to be granted a loan, the lender must deem
the borrower to be creditworthy.
Our econometric framework allows us to
capture the sequential nature of the credit
granting process: In stage one, an individual
states whether she/he knows a place where she/
he can borrow. In stage two, she/he decides
whether to apply for credit. In stage three, the
lender decides whether to accept or reject the
loan application. We model the credit applica-
tion process below.
Y0 ¼ 1 if the individual states that
she=he knows a place to borrow;
and zero otherwise:
Y1 ¼ 1 if the individual applies for a loan; and
zero otherwise:
Y2 ¼ 1 if individual is granted a loan; and zero
otherwise:
In our data, for a given individual, Y1 is not
observed unless Y0 ¼ 1. An individual is asked
whether she applied for a loan only if she states
that she knows at least one place from which
she can borrow. Furthermore, due to the nature
of the loan application process, Y2 is not
observed unless Y1 ¼ 1. 16 We estimate a three-
stage probit model and correct for the sample
selection bias as in Zeller (1994).
To correct for selection bias, we include the
inverse Mill’s ratio from the ﬁrst-stage probit
model as an additional regressor in the second-
stage probit. We then include the inverse Mill’s
ratio from the second-stage probit as an addi-
tional regressor in the third-stage probit. Theomission of the inverse Mill’s ratio may lead to
biased estimates (Greene, 1990). This can be
thought of as an omitted variable problem since
the expected value of Y1ðY2Þ given that Y1ðY2Þ is
observed depends on the probability that
Y0 ¼ 1 (Y1 ¼ 1). By including the inverse Mill’s
ratio as an additional regressor, we can obtain
unbiased estimates for the variables of inter-
est.
We should note that we also do not observe
all the speciﬁc lenders to which a given indi-
vidual has applied for credit, but only observe
the type of lender if the individual was suc-
cessful in obtaining a loan. Therefore, when we
analyze the determinants of obtaining credit,
we do not diﬀerentiate between speciﬁc credit
sources.
The second part of our analysis focuses on
the factors that aﬀect an individual’s informa-
tion about lending sources, with close atten-
tion to the determinants of awareness of new
credit sources. In order to participate in a
credit market, an individual ﬁrst needs to
know a place where s/he can borrow. Social
networks may play an important role in
improving individuals’ familiarity with new
credit sources.
We estimate a bivariate probit where our
dependent variables are two binary choice
variables, Y0N and Y0E, indicating an individ-
ual’s awareness of new and established credit
sources, respectively. More formally
Y0N ¼ 1 if individual states that
she=he knows a new source to
borrow from; zero otherwise:
Y0E ¼ 1 if individual states that she=he knows
an established source to borrow from;
zero otherwise:
We use a bivariate probit procedure because
we recognize that information about the two
types of credit sources will be interdependent.
We also assume that observations are corre-
lated for individuals within the same household
and independent for individuals from diﬀerent
households.
As discussed earlier, a problem that arises in
estimating the eﬀect of community (and family
networks) is that community participation may
capture unobservable individual and commu-
nity traits that aﬀect credit market access. For
example, the community participation variable
may be subject to endogeneity bias if individ-
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CREDIT ACCESS 1233uals who wish to borrow also choose to attend
the community meeting, if only to ﬁnd out
about other individuals’ experience with the
lenders. If this is the case, participation in
community meetings may signal interest in
borrowing, which raises the likelihood that
the individual borrows. Furthermore, the
lender may require the borrower to attend
community meetings as a condition for loan
approval.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of our
community activity variable, we take the fol-
lowing steps. First, we instrument the partici-
pation variable using the average occurrence of
community meetings (OCCUR), measured at
the community level. Our instrument for indi-
vidual-level participation is constructed by
calculating the share of household heads who
indicate that a community meeting has occur-
red in the community in the past 12 months.
We argue that community meeting occurrence
is a valid instrument because while it is corre-
lated with individual participation in commu-
nity activity (raw correlation coeﬃcient
between participation and OCCUR is 0.27 and
signiﬁcant at the 1% level), it is less likely
to be correlated with a given individual’s
credit market attributes. We implement the
Amemiya Generalized Least Squares (AGLS)
estimator for probit with endogenous regres-
sors. The endogenous regressors are treated as
linear functions of the instruments and the
other exogenous variables (Newey, 1987).
Second, we adopt a community ﬁxed-eﬀects
speciﬁcation to deal with unobserved heteroge-
neity at the community level. We recognize that
unobserved community variables may aﬀect
both participation and credit market outcomes.
For example, community participation may be
inﬂuenced by quality of infrastructure, commu-
nity leadership, or other less-measurable vari-
ables, which in turn aﬀect credit market access.
Thus, a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on
community participation may be due to a spu-
rious correlation between individual participa-
tion and unobserved community variables.
Finally, community participation may also
reﬂect a high level of caring, or commitment to
the community, which reduces the incentive for
opportunistic behavior and may lower the
probability of loan default. We introduce indi-
vidual characteristics that proxy for commit-
ment to the community, such as recent migration
experience and government employee status.
The addition of these variables should reduce
concerns that community participation is aproxy for individual personality traits that may
also aﬀect credit access.6. RESULTS
(a) Credit access
In this section, we analyze the determinants of
credit access using a three-stage probit model.
We investigate the role of networks on the
decision to apply for credit, as well as the out-
come of the credit application process. Before
we decompose the credit outcome into infor-
mation, application and grant processes, we
estimate a reduced form regression where our
dependent variable is equal to 1 if individual has
received a loan and 0 otherwise (results are not
shown). Our regressors include participation in
community meeting, number of economically
active siblings, per capita expenditure, interac-
tion of expenditure with participation, marital
status, gender, household headship, years of
schooling, age, age squared, religion, house-
hold size, farm ownership, urban residence, and
distance to the nearest ﬁnancial institution.
According to this reduced form regression, the
coeﬃcients on community (participation) and
family (sibling) network variables are 0.36 and
0.03, respectively, and signiﬁcant at 1%.
Household heads, married, older and more
educated individuals are more likely to obtain
loans. Perhaps surprisingly, males and urban
households are less likely to receive loans. It will
be of interest to decompose these eﬀects and
examine how networks enhance credit market
outcomes. Does network participation provide
information to potential borrowers and
encourage them to apply or does participation
increase the likelihood of a positive response
from the lender? Is a male individual or an
urban household less likely to be aware of credit
opportunities or less likely to be granted credit?
Our ﬁrst-stage equation examines whether an
individual is aware of any sources to obtain
credit. The dependent variable at the ﬁrst-stage
is equal to 1 if the individual states that s/he
knows a place where s/he can borrow, and zero
otherwise. The second-stage equation examines
the decision to apply for credit. We correct for
sample selection bias when we analyze the
determinants of the loan application process (as
we only observe the loan application process
for individuals who state that they know a
place where they can borrow). The third-stage
equation allows us to study the probability that
WORLD DEVELOPMENT1234an individual is granted credit. We also correct
for sample selection bias in the third-stage.
Table 2 presents ﬁrst-stage probit estimation
where we analyze the determinants of aware-
ness of credit sources. Both community meeting
participation and the number of economicallyTable 2.
Explanatory variables
Network variables
Participation
Economically active siblings
Individual variables
Head
Sex (male¼ 1)
Marital status (married¼ 1)
Years schooling
Muslim (¼ 1)
Age
Age squared
Household variables
Per capita household expenditure
Business owner in household
Farm owner in household
Household size
1 if there is a shock in 93
Community variables
Urban (¼ 1)
Distance to nearest ﬁnancial institution
Province dummies
Observations
v2
Log likelihood
R-squared
Dependent variable: 1 if individual knows a place to borro
a Standard errors in parentheses.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.active siblings have positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀects on awareness of credit sources. House-
hold heads and older individuals are more
likely to state that they know a place where
they can borrow. Gender, marital status, edu-
cational attainment, and wealth also appearStage 1
Coeﬃcient
0.316
(0.033)a
0.016
(0.004)
0.132
(0.037)
0.131
(0.033)
0.166
(0.033)
0.091
(0.004)
0.049
(0.052)
0.025
(0.004)
)0.350
(0.047)
0.478
(0.065)
0.124
(0.026)
0.006
(0.030)
0.004
(0.005)
0.052
(0.064)
0.102
(0.031)
)0.006
(0.002)
Yes
13,872
2932.8
)7151.67
0.17
w.
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CREDIT ACCESS 1235important for being familiar with credit
opportunities. We also ﬁnd that household
resources, measured by per capita household
expenditure, and business ownership have
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the proba-
bility that an individual is familiar with credit
sources. Urbanization is positively associated
with the awareness of credit sources and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, while as might be expected
distance to the nearest ﬁnancial institution have
a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on awareness.
Table 3 presents the second-stage probit
estimation where we analyze the determinants
of the decision to apply for credit. Our depen-
dent variable is equal to 1 if the individual has
applied for credit in the last 12 months, and zero
otherwise. Social networks have an important
role to play in the credit application process. We
ﬁnd that participation in the community meet-
ing and the number of economically active sib-
lings both have positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the decision to apply. In particular, partici-
pation in community meeting increases the
probability of applying for credit by 8%. 17
Individual and household characteristics also
inﬂuence the credit application decision. Simi-
lar to our earlier ﬁndings, age, household
headship, and marital status are positively
associated with the decision to apply to a credit
source. In addition, educational attainment and
household resources have a positive and sig-
niﬁcant decision on the application decision. It
is interesting to note that when controlling for
household headship, males are less likely to
apply. Religion (Muslim¼ 1) has a negative
impact on the decision to apply for credit.
We also control for whether a household
experienced a shock in the survey period.
Individuals who experienced a negative shock
to their income in 1997 are more likely to apply.
Perhaps, surprisingly, we ﬁnd that individuals
from households with farm ownership are less
likely to apply for credit. Community variables,
such as urban residence and distance to the
nearest ﬁnancial institution are not signiﬁcant
determinants of the application decision.
Table 4 presents our third-stage probit results
where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if
individual is granted credit, and zero otherwise.
From Table 4, we ﬁnd that participation in a
community meeting has a positive eﬀect on the
probability of being granted credit at 1% sig-
niﬁcance level, while number of economically
active siblings is positive and signiﬁcant at 10%
signiﬁcance level. A change in an individual’s
participation status increases the probability ofbeing granted credit by about 6%. In our
empirical analysis, our measures of household
resources, including per capita expenditure, and
farm ownership, have positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the probability that an individual
obtains credit.
We should note that we do not ﬁnd a negative
and signiﬁcant eﬀect of family networks on
access to credit, and hence do not ﬁnd any evi-
dence that family networks may hinder an
individual’s access to credit by diluting bor-
rower’s incentives as discussed in Fafchamps
and Minten (2002). In fact, we ﬁnd a small,
positive eﬀect of number of economically active
siblings on obtaining credit. We should also note
that household size has an insigniﬁcant impact
on obtaining credit. Starting at the mean, an
additional economically active sibling increases
the probability of being granted credit by 0.04%.
Our results on the eﬀect of household debt on
the probability of obtaining credit deserve close
attention (Table 4, Regression 2). Household
debt has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
obtaining credit. These results are consistent
with Zeller (1994), and indicate the lender’s
ability to observe the applicant’s debt and asset
position. From the lender’s viewpoint, a high
debt burden may suggest an increased risk of
loan default.
We also examine closely the coeﬃcient on the
interaction term (participation· per capita
expenditure level). The interaction variable
(participation · per capita household expendi-
ture) has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
probability of being granted credit. This ﬁnding
may suggest that poorer individuals are more
likely to beneﬁt from social networks.
Interestingly, educational attainment, house-
hold headship, and marital status do not appear
to be important determinants of obtaining
credit (once we have controlled for the decision
to apply). We also ﬁnd that females are more
likely to be granted credit. The observation that
female applicants are more likely to obtain
credit may provide support for Churchill’s
(1999) observation that lenders prefer to lend to
females due to their lower default rates. It is also
noteworthy that our results provide some evi-
dence that urban households are less likely to
obtain credit. This suggests that with migration
from rural to urban areas, access to credit for
the urban poor may be an important policy
concern. It is important to note that there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in our results for the
apply and grant decisions, suggesting that some
lender requirements may not be satisﬁed by
Table 3. Stage 2
Explanatory variables Coeﬃcient
Network variables
Participation 0.208
(0.039)a
Economically active siblings 0.014
(0.004)
Individual variables
Head 0.318
(0.042)
Sex (male¼ 1) )0.124
(0.039)
Marital status (married¼ 1) 0.301
(0.042)
Years schooling 0.014
(0.008)
Muslim (¼ 1) )0.215
(0.053)
Age 0.048
(0.006)
Age squared )0.587
(0.068)
Household variables
Per capita household expenditure 0.102
(0.055)
Business owner in household 0.032
(0.030)
Farm owner in household )0.104
(0.033)
Household size 0.013
(0.006)
1 if there is a shock in 97 0.205
(0.035)
Community variables
Urban (¼ 1) )0.008
(0.034)
Distance to nearest ﬁnancial institution 0.003
(0.002)
Province dummies Yes
Mills’ ratio 0.588
(0.186)
Observations 9,534
v2 736.81
Log likelihood )6182.7838
R-squared 0.0562
Dependent variable: 1 if individual knows a place to borrow and has applied for a loan.
a Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT1236those individuals who apply. Farm ownership
was found to have a negative eﬀect on theprobability of applying for credit, while it has
a positive eﬀect on being granted credit.
Table 4. Stage 3
Explanatory variables 1 2 (with debt) 3 (IV for participation)
Network variables
Participation 0.210 0.243 1.560
(0.064)a (0.066) (0.241)
Economically active siblings 0.012 0.017 0.01
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Participation · per capita expenditure )0.265 )0.285 )0.476
(0.161) (0.164) (0.641)
Individual variables
Head )0.042 )0.028 0.052
(0.074) (0.077) (0.075)
Sex (male¼ 1) )0.204 )0.216 )0.195
(0.064) (0.068) (0.063)
Marital status (married¼ 1) 0.101 0.097 0.172
(0.071) (0.071) (0.073)
Years schooling )0.007 )0.01 )0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Muslim (¼ 1) 0.514 0.496 0.585
(0.061) (0.063) (0.062)
Age 0.01 0.013 0.024
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age squared )0.129 )0.168 )0.295
(0.117) (0.122) (0.120)
Household variables
Per capita household expenditure 0.314 0.330 0.321
(0.114) (0.117) (0.207)
Household debt in 1993 )0.01
(0.001)
Farm owner in household 0.120 0.116 0.065
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Household size 0.009 0.006 0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Community variables
Urban (¼ 1) )0.118 )0.105 )0.129
(0.051) (0.053) (0.052)
Distance to nearest ﬁnancial institution )0.011 )0.012 )0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mills’ ratio )0.927 )0.846 )0.562
(0.181) (0.184) (0.188)
Observations 4,245 4,007 4,245
v2 274.85 275.92
Log likelihood )2313.1137 )2186.2341
R-squared 0.0561 0.0594
Dependent variable: 1 if granted loan.
a Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CREDIT ACCESS 1237The distance to the nearest ﬁnancial institu-
tion in the community has a negative and sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of beinggranted credit. This is an important result as it
may imply that the costs of screening and
monitoring borrowers may rise with distance
WORLD DEVELOPMENT1238from the ﬁnancial institutions. We should note
that community variables such as urban resi-
dence and distance to the nearest ﬁnancial
institution were not signiﬁcant determinants of
the application decision, while these were found
to be important in being granted credit.
As we discussed in the previous section, par-
ticipation may be endogenous to an individual’s
decision to apply for credit. In order to address
this potential problem, we instrument for indi-
vidual participation with average occurrence of
community meeting (OCCUR) and use the
predicted value from the probit estimation of
participation on this variable in the analysis.
The ﬁrst- and second-stage probit estimations
remain comparable when we instrument for
individual level participation. These results are
not shown, but are available upon request.
In addition, participation in community
networks remains positive and signiﬁcant in
obtaining credit when we instrument with
occurrence of community activity, which
increases our conﬁdence in our results. There
are, however, some noteworthy diﬀerences for
the grant equation when we instrument for
participation (Table 4, Column 3). In particu-
lar, the number of economically active siblings
and the interaction term of participation with
per capita expenditure are no longer statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in this estimation.
(b) Awareness of credit sources: new versus
established sources of credit
In this section, we present results on the
awareness or familiarity with new and estab-
lished credit sources. The dependent variable is
based on the question ‘‘Do you know a place
where you can borrow?’’ In Table 5, we present
results from the bivariate probit on access to
credit from new and established institutions. In
Table 6, we recognize the potential endogeneity
of individual participation to awareness of
credit sources and use an instrumental variable
estimation method where participation is in-
strumented with occurrence of a community
meeting (OCCUR). We also present our com-
munity ﬁxed-eﬀects logit results in Table 6. We
introduce additional controls for the quality of
networks, and these results are presented in
Table 7. Table 8 presents results for urban and
rural areas, respectively.
Table 5 presents the bivariate probit results
on awareness of new and established credit
sources. This approach allows us to uncover
diﬀerences in the eﬀects of family and com-munity networks in circulating information
about credit sources. Drawing on insights
from the literature on agricultural technology
adoption decisions, we predict that networks
will be more important in improving aware-
ness about new credit sources among potential
borrowers.
From our results, networks appear particu-
larly important in gaining awareness of new
credit sources. Participation in a community
meeting increases the probability of knowledge
of new (established) credit sources by 11%
(8%). We ﬁnd that family networks have posi-
tive and signiﬁcant impact on familiarity with
new credit sources (but it is shown to be sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant for established credit
sources). Starting at the mean an additional
economically active sibling increases awareness
of new credit sources by 0.005%. The relatively
small impact of the family networks on
knowledge of new credit sources can be
explained by noting that the family network
may be limited in its ability to provide new
information due to its small group size and the
tendency for incomes (and characteristics) to be
highly correlated within family networks.
We interpret the above results as support for
an information-based view of the role of net-
works in credit markets. In particular, partici-
pation in community meetings may reduce the
cost of information acquisition associated with
credit transactions for a potential borrower.
Because potential borrows are less likely to be
familiar with new credit institutions, it is not
surprising that our social network measures are
more important in raising awareness on new
credit sources.
The household’s economic position appears
to play a reduced role in gaining awareness of
new credit sources. In particular, household per
capita expenditure has a relatively small impact
on familiarity with new sources of credit,
compared to its eﬀect on established credit
sources. A 10% increase in per capita house-
hold expenditure increases awareness of new
(established) credit sources by 3.8% (7.5%). We
also note that farm and business ownership are
statistically insigniﬁcant in knowing a new
credit source. Interestingly, men are also about
10% more likely to report familiarity with
established sources of credit (while gender is
statistically insigniﬁcant in familiarity with new
sources of credit). There are some similarities in
the eﬀect of age, marital status, and educational
attainment on the awareness of new and
established sources of credit.
Table 5. Bivariate probit estimation
Explanatory variables New Established
Marginal eﬀect Coeﬃcient Marginal eﬀect Coeﬃcient
Network variables
Participation 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.22
(0.03)a (0.03)
Economically active siblings 0.01 0.02 0.002 0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
Individual variables
Head 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.08
(0.04) (0.04)
Sex (male¼ 1) 0.005 0.01 0.09 0.24
(0.03) (0.03)
Marital status (married¼ 1) 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08
(0.04) (0.03)
Years schooling 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.11
(0.00) (0.00)
Muslim (¼ 1) 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.03
(0.05) (0.05)
Age 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.00) (0.00)
Age squared )0.07 )0.22 )0.09 )0.22
(0.05) (0.05)
Household variables
Per capita household expenditure 0.06 0.16 0.20 0.51
(0.06) (0.08)
Business owner in household 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.20
(0.03) (0.03)
Farm owner in household )0.01 )0.04 )0.01 )0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Household size 0.001 0.00 0.003 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
1 if there is a shock in 93 )0.01 )0.03 0.02 0.04
(0.08) (0.07)
Community variables
Urban (¼ 1) 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.15
(0.03) (0.03)
Distance to nearest ﬁnancial institution )0.003 )0.01 )0.005 )0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
Province dummies Yes Yes
Observations 13,872
v2 3764.29
Log likelihood )14493.474
Dependent variable: 1 if individual knows a new (established) place to borrow.
aRobust standard errors (with clustering at the household level) are in parentheses.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CREDIT ACCESS 1239The results on community variables appear
consistent with predictions. Urban residence
appears to enhance an individual’s awareness ofcredit. We should note that urban residence was
found to have a negative eﬀect on being granted
credit. Thus, while urban residents are more
Table 6. Dependent variable: 1 if individual knows a new (established) place to borrow
Explanatory variables IVa Community ﬁxed-eﬀects
(logit)
1 2 3 4
New Established New Established
Network variables
Participation 1.193 0.109 0.461 0.402
(0.170)b (0.161) (0.053) (0.054)
Economically active siblings 0.014 0.006 0.021 0.012
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Individual variables
Head )0.022 0.087 0.143 0.151
(0.042) (0.039) (0.066) (0.063)
Sex (male¼ 1) )0.130 0.260 0.071 0.444
(0.044) (0.042) (0.058) (0.056)
Marital status (married¼ 1) 0.014 0.088 0.154 0.198
(0.037) (0.034) (0.062) (0.058)
Years schooling 0.075 0.116 0.147 0.187
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Muslim (¼ 1) 0.152 0.037 0.260 )0.149
(0.051) (0.050) (0.116) (0.121)
Age 0.003 0.018 0.031 0.027
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Age squared )0.09 )0.241 )0.449 )0.397
(0.057) (0.052) (0.095) (0.084)
Household variables
Per capita household expenditure 0.105 0.562 0.207 0.837
(0.050) (0.060) (0.087) (0.113)
Business owner in household 0.041 0.204 0.091 0.313
(0.026) (0.025) (0.047) (0.046)
Farm owner in household )0.075 )0.025 )0.069 0.103
(0.031) (0.029) (0.059) (0.056)
Household size 0.004 0.010 0.014 0.020
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
1 if there is a shock in 93 )0.007 0.049 )0.019 0.119
(0.062) (0.061) (0.110) (0.110)
Community variables
Urban (¼ 1) 0.133 0.158
(0.031) (0.030)
Distance to nearest ﬁnancial institution )0.007 )0.012
(0.002) (0.002)
Province dummies Yes Yes No No
Observations 13,872 13,872 13,698 13,862
a In the IV probits, participation is instrumented by the average occurrance of community meeting activity.
b Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT1240knowledgeable about credit opportunities, they
seem to have more diﬃculty in obtaining credit.
We ﬁnd that the distance from the village/towncenter to the nearest ﬁnancial institution has a
negative eﬀect on awareness of credit from both
established and new credit sources.
Table 7. Quality of networks (bivariate probit estimation)a
Explanatory variables 1 2 3
New Established New Established New Established
Network variables
Participation 0.47 0.32 0.31 0.24 0.30 0.18
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Number of economically
active Siblings
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01)
Interaction terms
Male participation )0.25 )0.17
(0.06) (0.06)
Household expendi-
ture  participation
0.02 )0.11
(0.10) (0.15)
Quality of network variables
Government
employee (¼ 1)
0.43 0.28
(0.07) (0.09)
Recent migrant (¼ 1) 0.29 0.15
(0.19) (0.30)
Average sibling nonfarm
business
0.05 0.17
(0.06) (0.06)
Frequency of visits with
siblings
)0.01 )0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Ethnic diversity index )0.12 )0.02
(0.08) (0.08)
Gini coeﬃcient 0.33 0.83
(0.43) (0.42)
Number of observations 13,872 13,872 7,985
Log-likelihood )14482.19 )14492.91 )8312.82
rho 0.52 0.52 0.47
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Dependent variable: 1 if individual knows a new (established) place to borrow.
aDependent variables are whether the individual knows an new/established source where he/she can borrow from. In
our analysis, we control for age, age squared, household headship, gender, marital status, per capita household
expenditure, urban residence, years of schooling, religion (muslim¼ 1), business and farm ownership, household size,
distance to ﬁnancial institution and province dummies. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CREDIT ACCESS 1241(c) Further robustness checks
(i) Potential endogeneity of individual
participation
Table 6 presents univariate probit results
where the dependent variable is awareness of
new (established) credit sources. Here, partici-
pation is instrumented with community-meet-
ing occurrence (OCCUR) using Amemiya
Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) estimators
for probit with endogenous regressors (Col-
umns 1 and 2). 18 We instrument for individual-level participation in community activity
because this variable may be endogenous
within the context of the borrower’s or lender’s
decision.
It is important to note that after we ins-
trument for our participation variable, the
community network remains positive and sig-
niﬁcant for familiarity with new credit sources
while it is no longer signiﬁcant for knowledge
of established credit sources. Again, the diﬀu-
sion of information is relevant where credit
sources are less familiar to potential borrowers.
Table 8. Role of networks in rural/urban areas (bivariate probit estimation)a
Explanatory
variables
Rural Urban
1 2 3 4
New Established New Established
Individual
participation
0.08 0.27 0.07 0.18 0.13 0.35 0.09 0.26
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Number of
economically
active siblings
0.004 0.012 0.0002 0.007 0.007 0.019 0.007 0.014
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of
observations
7,904 5,968
Dependent variable: 1 if individual knows a new (established) place to borrow.
aRobust standard errors (with clustering at the household level) are shown in parentheses. The dependent variables are
whether an individual knows a place (new or established) where they can borrow. In our analysis, we control for age, age
squared, household headship, gender (male¼ 1), marital status, number of economically active siblings, per capita
household expenditure, urban residence, yrs of schooling, religion, business and farm ownership, household size, dis-
tance to ﬁnancial institution (in km) and urban status. We include province dummies to control for regional variation.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT1242Similarly, the number of economically active
siblings has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on
awareness of new credit sources, but does not
have a signiﬁcant impact on established credit
sources.
The results presented in Table 6 allow us to
further examine diﬀerences in the determinants
of awareness of credit sources. Consistent with
our earlier ﬁndings, educational attainment and
per capita household expenditure remain posi-
tively associated with awareness of new and
established credit sources. When we instrument
for participation, we ﬁnd that men are less
likely to report awareness of new credit sources
(although they are more likely to be familiar
with established credit sources).
(ii) Community ﬁxed-eﬀects
As discussed in Section 4, unobserved heter-
ogeneity at the community level might aﬀect
our results on the relevance of community
networks in awareness of and gaining access to
credit. More speciﬁcally, unmeasured commu-
nity attributes such as infrastructure, commu-
nity leadership, and law enforcement may aﬀect
both access to credit and our measure of com-
munity participation, leading to a spurious
relationship between credit access and net-
works. To address this problem of unobserved
heterogeneity, we introduce a community ﬁxed-
eﬀects logit speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd that partici-
pation and number of economically activesiblings remain positive and signiﬁcant in
awareness of both new and established credit
sources (Table 6, Columns 3 and 4).
Our community ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation
provides an important robustness check. Indi-
vidual participation in the community meeting
may reﬂect unobserved community attributes.
For example, when we use participation in
community health post (posyandu) in place of
participation in community meeting, we ﬁnd
this variable to be positive and signiﬁcant in the
standard bivariate probit speciﬁcation for
knowing a place where one can borrow. But
when we include this variable in a community
ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation, this variable is no
longer statistically signiﬁcant. 19 The fact that
our participation in community activity mea-
sure is robust to the inclusion of community
ﬁxed-eﬀects increases our conﬁdence in that
this variable is not merely capturing unob-
served community attributes, but rather the
informational advantage associated with net-
works.
(iii) Quality of networks
An interesting question is how gender aﬀects
returns to participation. To answer this ques-
tion, we include an interaction term of male
with participation (Table 7, Speciﬁcation 1).
We ﬁnd that the interaction term is negative
and signiﬁcant in awareness of both new and
established credit sources. This implies that
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CREDIT ACCESS 1243women are more likely than men to beneﬁt
from participating in community networks in
gaining awareness of credit opportunities.
Another policy-relevant question is how
income and wealth aﬀect the beneﬁts from
participating in community networks. One
could argue that networks may confer infor-
mational advantages on the rich at the expense
of the poor. To test this argument, we interact
per capita expenditure with participation and
include these results in Table 7, Speciﬁcation 2.
We ﬁnd the interaction term to be insigniﬁcant
in awareness of credit sources, thereby reducing
concerns that the rich gain more from partici-
pating in networks.
To further control for the impact of quality
of networks on access to credit, we include
additional variables to measure for various
aspects of networks to our baseline speciﬁca-
tion presented in Table 2 (Table 7, Speciﬁcation
3).
At the individual-level, we introduce controls
for recent migration and government employee
status, which may proxy for commitment to the
community as well as stability of future income
and thus aﬀect an individual’s ability to gather
information about credit opportunities. To
measure the quality of the family network, we
include the sibling wealth variable and the fre-
quency of visits with siblings. To measure the
quality of the community network, we include
an index of ethnic diversity and the Gini coef-
ﬁcient.
Our results on family and community net-
work variables remain positive and signiﬁcant
in awareness of credit sources. We now turn
our attention to our quality of network vari-
ables. Recent migration status does not have a
statistically signiﬁcant impact on awareness of
credit from new institutions, although it is
positive and signiﬁcant for established credit. 20
In addition, sibling wealth has a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on awareness of established
credit whereas it is insigniﬁcant for aware-
ness of new credit sources. Government
employee status has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on awareness of both types of credit
sources. We note that the frequency of visits
with siblings is not a signiﬁcant determinant of
awareness.
The ethnic diversity index has a negative
eﬀect on awareness of credit from new sources
and is signiﬁcant at the 12% level of signiﬁcance
while it has no eﬀect on awareness from
established sources of credit. Hence, ethnic
diversity does not appear to be a majorimpediment to the ﬂow of information about
credit market opportunities. Our additional
measure of community network quality, the
Gini coeﬃcient does not have a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on awareness of new credit
sources, while it has a positive eﬀect on
awareness of credit from established sources
with signiﬁcance at 10%.(iv) The role of networks in urban and rural
areas
In Table 8, we present results on the relative
importance of networks across rural and urban
settings. Our results here suggest that commu-
nity networks may have a critical role to play in
urban communities. For urban households,
both individual participation and number of
economically active siblings have positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀects on access to new and estab-
lished credit sources. But social networks are
shown to have a larger impact on gaining
familiarity with new credit sources. Participa-
tion in a community meeting increases the
probability of familiarity with new (established)
credit sources by 13% (9%) for urban house-
holds. Starting at the mean, an additional
economically active sibling increases awareness
of new (established) credit sources by 0.007%
(0.005%) for urban households.
We now focus on results for rural house-
holds, with individual-level participation as the
measure of the community network. Interest-
ingly, an individual’s participation in a com-
munity meeting has a smaller eﬀect on the
awareness of new (established) credit sources in
rural areas. Participation in a community
meeting increases the probability of awareness
of new (established) credit sources by 9% (7%)
for rural households. Again, participation in
community-level activity may be less relevant
for access to new credit sources in rural areas,
where borrowers have access to high-quality
and reliable information through other chan-
nels, such as kinship. We also note that the
family network does not have a statistically
signiﬁcant impact on familiarity with estab-
lished credit sources for rural households. As
we discussed earlier, the family network may be
limited in its ability to provide new information
due to its small group size and the tendency for
incomes (and characteristics) to be highly cor-
related within family networks. The correlation
of family incomes and characteristics may be
high in rural areas where income sources tend
to be less diversiﬁed.
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In this paper, we investigate the role of
family and community networks in enhancing
access to credit. There has been very little
empirical work that documents the importance
of networks in credit market outcomes in
developing countries.
Results from the Indonesia Family Life
Surveys suggest that community participation,
and to a lesser extent family networks have an
important impact on an individual’s ability to
access credit. The empirical results also shed
light on the importance of community partici-pation for women and the poor in enhancing
access to credit. Community networks appear
particularly important in gaining awareness of
new credit sources, suggesting that networks
play an important role in the diﬀusion of
knowledge about credit opportunities.
Collective action in developing countries has
been shown to aﬀect environmental outcomes,
technology adoption, and the provision of
public goods. With the growing importance of
microlending and other credit interventions in
many low-income environments, more research
is needed to uncover the role of institutions in
enhancing credit market outcomes.NOTES1. The success of microlending programs among the
poor may lie in a diverse set of mechanisms including
joint liability, peer monitoring, contingent renewal, as
well as social cohesion among group members (Ghatak,
1999; Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999; Morduch, 1999;
Wydick, 1999). Group lending programs may also rely
on social sanctions and nonreﬁnancing threats to induce
prompt repayment among borrowers.
2. There are a few notable exceptions: Udry (1994)
discusses the role of village authorities and family elders
in enforcing informal credit contracts in Northern
Nigeria. Zeller (1994) shows that local formal credit
institutions use locally available information about the
applicant’s credit-worthiness.
3. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out
this possibility.
4. The IFLS sample was selected to capture the
socioeconomic diversity of the country while remaining
cost-eﬀective given size and terrain of the country––13
out of 27 provinces were sampled, and this represents
83% of the Indonesia population5. The highly centralized nature of the Suharto regime
(1968–98) meant that neighborhood associations, local
associations, and town and village development councils
formed part of a steeply ascending pyramid, headed by
the central government. Within towns and villages,
households are organized into smaller units known as
Ruskin Warga (RW) and Ruku Tetangga (RT). Ruskin
Warga refers to the village mutual assistance association
while Ruskin Tetangga is a neighborhood association.
Local residents lead the RW and RT, and these leadersare unpaid volunteers, and not employed by the
government.
6. Our data also support this argument. Women,
recent migrants, and individuals with lower income are
less likely to participate in community meetings.
7. A quote from a survey respondent from the Indo-
nesian report of Voices of the Poor illustrates this
point: http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/voices/reports/
national/indon5-7.pdf (p. 87): Krungu Krungu untuk
bantuan (which is translated as follows: ‘‘I heard rumors
of assistance, but no one seems to know where it is’’).
8. The precursor to the modern BRI was the Hulp-en
Spaarbank der Inlandsche Bestuurs Ambtenaren, or ‘The
Assistance and Savings Bank for Native Government
Employees’ which was founded in 1895 in Central Java.
9. At the BRI units, collateral is used as a symbol of
the client’s commitment, not a secondary repayment
source (Churchill, 1999) as units almost never seize the
collateral of clients in the case of delinquent repayment.
10. This idea builds on a well-known literature on the
role of nonmarket institutions in dealing with credit
market imperfections. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and
Varian (1990). Social collateral and reputation play a
crucial role in determining access to credit (Besley &
Coate, 1995).
11. In many parts of Indonesia, the role of women in
community activity tends to be limited, and their inﬂuence
in community issues tends to occur through women’s
groups and associations (Mukherjee, 2002, p. 15).
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND CREDIT ACCESS 124512. See Frankenberg and Thomas (2000) for a detailed
description of the IFLS surveys.
13. We exclude family lending from our empirical
analysis, but note that there is a high degree of reliance
on family members for access to credit. About 35% of
our sample of individuals report that they can borrow
from family. There is considerable overlap in categories,
which suggests that a large share of our sample
participate in both family and nonfamily credit net-
works. About 10% report that they can borrow from
family only, 30% report formal credit access only, 2%
report informal credit access only, and 12% report that
they can borrow from both formal and informal lenders.
14. Okten and Osili (2003) study the factors that
contribute to existence of community organizations in
Indonesia.
15. Our Gini coeﬃcient index was constructed using
per capita household expenditure data, and it is
computed at the kecamatan (district) level. The Gini
coeﬃcient index is used as a measure of inequality in a
community.
16. Previous studies have observed that certain indi-
viduals may not apply for a loan if they do not expect to
receive a loan oﬀer. These individuals may be considered
discouraged borrowers, and may be quite similar to loan
applicants who were denied credit (Zeller, 1994). Our
sample of credit applicants may not contain a large
number of discouraged borrowers as we expect thatdiscouraged borrowers are less likely to report that they
know a place to borrow.
17. Marginal eﬀects of all variables though not pre-
sented are available upon request.
18. We also tried a diﬀerent IV method suggested by a
referee. We estimated a ﬁrst-stage ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression of the participation on all exogenous
variables and instruments. We then obtained the resid-
uals from this regression and added the residuals in the
second step limited dependent variable regression, in
addition to the un-instrumented participation variable.
Participation variable remains positive and signiﬁcant
comparable to results presented in the paper using
AGLS. The residuals are insigniﬁcant for the established
credit sources while they are negative and signiﬁcant for
the new credit sources. This suggests that our concerns
for the possible endogeneity of the participation vari-
able are especially valid for awareness of new credit
sources.
19. These results, though not shown, are available
upon request.20. At ﬁrst glance, this result may appear puzzling
since recent movers may lack information that are
important in having access to credit. We explain this
result by noting that movers in our data are more likely
to live in urban areas than nonmovers. It is possible,
however, that the decision to move may be endogenous
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